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Abstract
We present a framework to learn privacy-preserving en-
codings of images that inhibit inference of chosen private
attributes, while allowing recovery of other desirable infor-
mation. Rather than simply inhibiting a given fixed pre-
trained estimator, our goal is that an estimator be unable
to learn to accurately predict the private attributes even
with knowledge of the encoding function. We use a nat-
ural adversarial optimization-based formulation for this—
training the encoding function against a classifier for the
private attribute, with both modeled as deep neural net-
works. The key contribution of our work is a stable and con-
vergent optimization approach that is successful at learning
an encoder with our desired properties—maintaining util-
ity while inhibiting inference of private attributes, not just
within the adversarial optimization, but also by classifiers
that are trained after the encoder is fixed. We adopt a rig-
orous experimental protocol for verification wherein clas-
sifiers are trained exhaustively till saturation on the fixed
encoders. We evaluate our approach on tasks of real-world
complexity—learning high-dimensional encodings that in-
hibit detection of different scene categories—and find that
it yields encoders that are resilient at maintaining privacy.
1. Introduction
Images and videos are rich in information about the en-
vironments they represent. This information can then be
used to infer various environment attributes such as loca-
tion, shapes and labels of objects, identities of individuals,
classes of activities and actions, etc. But often, it is desir-
able to share data—with other individuals, un-trusted ap-
plications, over a network, etc.—without revealing values
of certain attributes that a user may wish kept private. For
such cases, we seek an encoding of this data that is privacy-
preserving, in that the encoded data prevents or inhibits the
estimation of specific sensitive attributes, but still retains
other information about the environment—information that
may be useful for inference of other, desirable, attributes.
When the relationship between data and attributes can be
explicitly modeled, it’s possible to derive an explicit form
for this encoding [7]. This includes the case where the goal
is to encode a fixed dataset with known values of the pri-
vate label (where privacy can be achieved, for example, by
partitioning the dataset into subsets with different values of
the private label, and explicitly transforming each set to the
same value [23]). This work deals instead with the setting
where the relationship between data and private attributes is
not explicit, and is learned through training an estimator.
Our goal is to find an encoding that prevents or inhibits
such a trained estimator or classifier from succeeding. Note
that we do not want an encoding that simply confounds a
fixed classifier or estimator. Rather, we want that even af-
ter the encoding is fixed, a classifier that has knowledge of
the encoding, and which can therefore be trained on en-
coded training data, is unable to make accurate predictions
when generalizing beyond the training set. This can be es-
pecially challenging in the vision setting when, for example,
an image has potentially multiple, redundant cues towards
a private environment attribute. While a specific censorship
strategy could cause failures in a given estimator by inter-
fering with the cues it depends on, given a chance to retrain,
the estimator learns to use different cues still present.
To address this issue, we consider a formulation to learn
an encoding function, through adversarial training against
a classifier that is simultaneously training to succeed at re-
covering the private attribute from encoded data. The en-
coder, in turn, trains to prevent this inference, while also
maintaining some notion of utility—a generic objective of
maintaining variance in its outputs or promoting the success
of a second classifier training for a different attribute.
This is a natural formulation given the success of ad-
versarial optimization [11], and has in fact previously been
considered in the privacy setting [8, 21, 14]. However, we
find standard adversarial optimization to be insufficient for
achieving privacy against complex inference tasks—when
producing high-dimensional encodings that inhibit recov-
ery of an image attribute whose value may be indicated by
multiple redundant cues in the input, against high-capacity
classifiers modeled as deep neural networks that are able
to discover and exploit such cues. In these cases, we find
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Figure 1. Training Classifiers on Learned Privacy-preserving Encoders. We show the evolution of validation set accuracy when learning
classifiers on outputs of encoders trained to preserve privacy and maintain utility. We consider two settings: encoders trained to inhibit
detection of the “Army Base” scene category while promoting “Airport Terminal”, and vice-versa. For each case, we examine classifiers
trained for both private and desirable tasks on encoded images. We compare to training classifiers on the original images themselves, as
well as on blurred images as a naive non-task specific baseline. For private tasks, we include comparisons to encoders also trained in the
same adversarial framework, but with standard GAN updates rather than our approach. Our encoders preserve information for desirable
tasks, while degrading the ability to solve private tasks—both in terms of training speed and final achieved accuracy. Moreover, our
approach yields encoders that are far more effective at preserving privacy than with standard GAN updates—even though the latter are able
to inhibit private classifiers within adversarial training, those classifiers recover to a much greater degree once the encoders are fixed.
that there is often a significant gap between the performance
of the private attribute classifier within and after adversar-
ial optimization. An encoder training simultaneously with
the classifier is able to keep the latter at bay, but the clas-
sifier recovers once it is able to train against an encoder
that has been fixed. We also find that training against high-
capacity classifiers leads to instability in the adversarial op-
timization, with the encoder often converging to a trivial lo-
cally optimal solution of producing a constant output—thus
achieving perfect privacy but eliminating all utility.
A key contribution of our work is thus our modified opti-
mization approach, that implicitly regularizes the optimiza-
tion by using a form of normalization in the encoder for sta-
bility, and uses modified gradient-based updates to promote
learning encoding functions that permanently limit recovery
of private attributes. We also adopt a rigorous experimental
protocol for evaluating privacy-preserving encoders, where
classifiers are trained exhaustively till saturation on learned
encoders after they have been fixed (see Fig. 1). We adopt
this protocol to evaluate our approach on a task with real-
world complexity—namely, inhibiting detection of scene
categories in images from the Places-365 dataset [28].
2. Related Work
Traditional Approaches to Privacy. There exist elegant
approaches to privacy that provide formal guarantees [7]
when the relationship between data elements and sensitive
attributes can be precisely characterized. This is also true
for the special case when the privacy preserving task is
aimed at a fixed dataset—in which case approaches such as
K-anonymity [23] can be employed, since the relationship
is simply the enumerated list of samples and their attribute
values. Our focus in this paper, however, is on applications
where this relationship is not precisely known, and data ele-
ments to be censored are high-dimensional and contain mul-
tiple, redundant cues towards the private label that a learned
estimator could be trained to exploit.
Much prior work on achieving privacy with such data,
especially with images and videos, has relied on domain
knowledge and hand-crafted approaches—such as pixela-
tion, blurring, face/object replacement, etc.—to degrade
sensitive information [1, 2, 4, 6, 13, 27]. These methods can
be effective in many practical settings when it is clear what
to censor, and some variants are even able to make the re-
sulting image look natural and possess chosen attributes—
e.g., replacing faces with generated ones [3, 5, 17] of differ-
ent individuals with the same expression, pose, etc. How-
ever, we consider the general case when all cues in an im-
age towards the private attribute can not be enumerated, and
that an adversary seeking to recover that attribute will learn
an estimator specifically for our encoding. This makes the
goal of learning an encoding significantly more challenging,
since modern classifiers, such as those based on deep neu-
ral networks, are able to learn to make accurate predictions
even from severely degraded data (e.g., [26]).
Adversarial Training. This naturally motivates an adver-
sarial framework for training an encoding function, against
a classifier being trained simultaneously trained to predict
the private attribute. Our approach builds on the recent suc-
cess of adversarial training for learning generative adversar-
ial networks (GANs) [11], which demonstrated the feasibil-
ity of using stochastic gradient descent (SGD) to optimize
a min-max objective involving deep neural networks with
competing goals. While the theoretical stationary point of
such optimization is where either network can not improve
when the other is fixed, such a point is rarely achieved (or
even sought) in practice when training GANs. In stark con-
trast, it is critical in our setting for the encoder to reach a
point where it maintains its success even after it is fixed,
while its adversary continues to train. Also worth noting
are recent works on adversarial examples [12, 20, 19, 18]
that learn perturbations to cause incorrect predictions. But,
these are trained as attacks against fixed classifiers that ex-
pect natural images, and such classifiers recover when re-
trained on examples with the perturbations.
Domain Confusion. There are interesting similarities be-
tween our formulation and those of various domain adapta-
tion / confusion methods [22, 24, 9, 10, 25]. Some of these
also set up an optimization problem to derive a feature rep-
resentation that is less indicative of a specific label (a private
label for us, domain identity for them). However, while do-
main confusion approaches can be thought of as optimiz-
ing a similar objective function, they have a fundamentally
different goal: generalization across domains, rather than
preventing information leakage to a determined adversary.
Domain confusion methods seek to ensure that classifiers
trained on their learned features transfer across domains.
To achieve this, it suffices to train against relatively simple
domain classifiers, whose actual accuracy need only be in-
hibited during adversarial training. In contrast, we evaluate
our encoder against much deeper classifiers as the adver-
sary, and measure success by allowing this classifier to train
after the encoder has been fixed. Ours is thus a substan-
tially different setting, which requires innovations in how
the optimization is carried out.
Adversarial Privacy. The closest formulations to ours are
those of [8, 21, 14]. These techniques also employ differ-
ent forms of adversarial optimization to learn image trans-
formations that will prevent a classifier (trained on trans-
formed images) from solving some sensitive task. While
these methods provide an interesting proof of concept, they
target relatively simple private tasks—namely preventing
the detection of synthetically superimposed text [8] or QR
codes [21], and show that adversarial training learns to de-
tect and blur the relevant regions—or attempt to censor low-
dimensional feature vectors [14].
As our experiments show, directly applying traditional
adversarial optimization—while successful in domain adap-
tation [24, 9, 10, 25] and the more limited privacy tasks [8,
21, 14]—fails when trying to persistently inhibit powerful
classifiers trained for complex real-world tasks on high-
dimensional encodings of natural images (see Fig. 1). This
work proposes an approach that is able to solve the under-
lying practical challenges, and by doing so, opens up the
possibility of using adversarial optimization practically and
effectively for an important new application: privacy.
3. Learning Private Encoding Functions
In this section, we begin by describing the formulation
for an adversarial framework to train an encoder to inhibit
classifiers for chosen sensitive attributes. This takes the
form of optimizing a min-max objective—similar to those
used in traditional GANs [11], adversarial domain adapta-
tion [24, 9, 10, 25] and the recent works on adversarial pri-
vacy [8, 21, 14]). We analyze this formulation, and discuss
ways to incorporate different types of constraints to main-
tain utility. We then describe our optimization approach,
that promotes stability during training and strengthens the
learned encoder’s ability to maintain privacy.
3.1. Privacy as Adversarial Objective
We consider the following setting: when training the en-
coder, we have a training set labeled with values of the
private attribute. Once the encoder has been trained, we
seek to limit the ability of an adversary, with knowledge
of this encoding function, to train an estimator for the pri-
vate attribute. This means that after the encoder is fixed,
we assume the adversary is able to train an estimator on
an encoded labeled training set (by applying the encoding
function on a regular training set), and we seek to restrict
the performance of this estimator on encoded validation and
test sets. Note that we do not seek to prevent the estimator
from performing well on the training set itself, e.g., through
memorization. Our goal is to limit generalization accuracy.
We let E : RN → RN ′ denote our encoding function
that maps an image x ∈ RN to an encoded counterpart
x′ = E(x) ∈ RN ′ , with the goal of preventing the esti-
mation of a private attribute u(x) ∈ U from the encoded
image x′. Consider a parameterized estimator Φ(x′; θu)
with learnable parameters θu that produces an estimate uˆ
of u(x) from the encoded image x′. Then, given a loss
L(uˆ, u) : U × U → R, our desired encoding function is
E = arg minE I(E;u) where
I(E;u) = −min
θU
E
p(x)
L (Φ (E(x); θU ) , u(x)) . (1)
Theoretical Analysis. Note that this is a min-max op-
timization between the parameters of the encoder E and
estimator Φ. Consider the case when U is a discrete la-
bel set, Φ is a classifier that produces a probability distri-
bution over these labels, and L is the cross-entropy loss.
Given an encoder E, let pE(x′) denote the distribution of
encoder outputs, and pE(x′;u) the distribution of encoder
outputs x′ conditioned on the label being u. Further, let
piu be probability of label u (i.e.,
∫
u(x)=u
p(x)dx), then
pE(x
′) =
∑
u piupE(x
′;u). Following the derivations in
[11], since the optimal output of a classifier for label u is:
Φ(x′)u = piupE(x′;u)/pE(x′), it follows that:
I(E;u) =
∫
p(x) log[piu(x)pE(E(x);u(x))/pE(E(x))]dx
=
∑
u
piu log piu −
∫
x′
pE(x
′) log pE(x′) dx′
+
∑
u
piu
(∫
x′
pE(x
′;u) log pE(x′;u) dx′
)
= −H(U) + h(X ′)− h(X ′|U), (2)
where h(X ′) is the differential entropy of encoder outputs
x′, h(X ′|U) is their conditional entropy given label u′,
and H(U) is entropy of the label distribution. Therefore,
I(E;u) is the mutual information between encoded outputs
and the private label u up to a constant (−H(U)). Note
when u is a binary label and both classes are equally bal-
anced (pi0 = pi1), I is also the Jensen Shannon divergence
between the two class distributions of encoder outputs.
Maintaining Utility. Absent any other constraints, I(E;u)
is trivially minimized by an encoder E(x) = C that outputs
a constant independent of the input. While such an encod-
ing would indeed achieve absolute privacy, it would be use-
less for all other tasks as well. We discuss two constraints
to maintain utility: a generic one in terms of variance, and
one with an objective of promoting specific desirable tasks.
For the generic constraint, we require that, on average
(over samples of data x), each element of the encoded out-
put have zero mean and unit variance, i.e., EE(x)i = 0 and
E E(x)2i = 1,∀i ∈ {1 . . . N ′}, where E(x)i denotes the
ith element of x′ = E(x). Therefore, the encoder is con-
strained to produce outputs with reasonable diversity, even
as it tries to remove information regarding the label u. This
constraint is aimed at maintaining information content in
the encoded outputs, so that these outputs may be informa-
tive for estimating attributes other than u.
Our second formulation for maintaining utility is defined
in terms of allowing the recovery of one or more specific
desirable attributes. Specifically, for such an attribute v(x),
we can define a corresponding I(E; v) similar to (1):
I(E; v) = −min
θV
E
p(x)
L (Φ (E(x); θV ) , v(x)) . (3)
An encoder to preserve v while inhibiting u is given by:
E = arg min Iu(E)− αIv(E), (4)
where α > 0 is a scalar weight. Note that we enforce the
zero mean and unit variance constraints on the encoder out-
puts for this case as well. The objective above involves an
adversarial optimization with a collaboration between the
encoder E and desirable attribute classifier parameters θv ,
against the classifier parameters θu for the private attribute.
Stability. In contrast to the standard GAN setting, where
the generator seeks to produce outputs to match a fixed data
distribution, the encoder in our setting has control over all
the conditional distributions that it is trying to bring close.
This has consequences on the stability of the optimization
process. While GANs are affected by degeneracy caused by
the discriminator reaching perfect accuracy, (1) is plagued
by a different form of instability. In our setting, optimiza-
tion is prone to collapse to the trivial solution of E(x) = C,
despite this being a violation of the variance constraint. This
occurs when gradient-based updates lead to internal layers
of the encoder being stuck at saturation, at which point the
encoder stops updating. As described in the next section,
our approach to optimization includes a form of normaliza-
tion on the encoder to address this instability.
Encoder and Classifier Architecture. We use deep-neural
networks to model the estimators Φ(·; θu) and Φ(·; θv). In
particular, we consider binary attributes and Φ corresponds
to a classifier trained with a cross-entropy loss L. We also
use a deep neural network to model the encoder E, and the
minimization in (1) and (3) are over network weights given
a chosen architecture. In this work, we focus on the case
when the inputs x are images, and the encoder also pro-
duces image-shaped outputs (224× 224 RGB images as in-
put, and three channel 28× 28 encoded outputs). Here, we
use convolutional layers and spatial pooling layers in both
the classifier and encoder architectures. The encoder’s final
layer is followed by a tanh non-linearity to produce outputs
that saturate between [−1.0, 1.0]. We enforce the zero mean
and unit variance constraints on the encoder outputs by sim-
ply placing a batch-normalization layer [15] after the output
of the final layer (in practice, we put this layer prior to the
pre-tanh activation), without any learnable scaling or bias.
3.2. Optimization Method
We train the encoder to minimize I(E;u) by applying
alternating gradient updates to the encoder and classifier(s).
These gradients are computed on mini-batches of training
data for the classification tasks, with different batches used
to update the encoder and classifiers. The classifiers take
gradient steps to minimize their losses with respect to the
true labels of the encoded data. When optimizing with the
desirable attribute classifier, the encoder’s update is also
based on minimizing that classifier’s loss.
Updates with Label Flip Loss. When computing gradients
for the encoder with respect to the private attribute classi-
fier, we find the negative cross-entropy as indicated in (1),
as well as the log-loss with respect to the incorrect label
typically used in GAN training [11] to be insufficient for
our setting. Note that both these losses encourage the en-
coder to drive the classifier to make mis-classifications with
Figure 2. Encoder and Classifier Architectures. We use convolutional architectures for both the encoder and classifier networks. To
ensure stable optimization and prevent the encoder from collapsing to a trivial solution, we use per-location normalization (depicted above
in black-and-white bars) without biases after every convolution layer in the encoder.
high confidence—based on the current state of the classifier.
However, the classifier can easily recover from such a state
after the encoder is fixed, by simply reversing its outputs
(true for false, and vice-versa)—because if the classifier has
high-confidence but incorrect predictions, this still implies a
separation in the per-class distributions of encoder outputs.
We propose a modified loss for encoder updates that pro-
vides a more direct path to minimizing the mutual informa-
tion towards the private label: we compute gradients with
respect to the cross-entropy loss treating the opposite of
whichever label the classifier currently predicts as the true
label. Thus while the classifier itself trains to increase its
accuracy, the encoder seeks to reduce the classifier’s confi-
dence in its predictions, be they correct or not. We find that
this approach typically causes the encoder to have a more
permanent effect on private classification ability that per-
sists even after the encoder has been fixed, as demonstrated
by our experiments in the next section.
Stability with Normalization. As discussed previously,
a significant source of instability in our setting is the en-
coder collapsing to the trivial solution, where it produces
a constant output independent of the input. As we will il-
lustrate with experiments, without any further constraints,
training frequently collapses to this degenerate solution de-
spite the normalization constraint at the output enforced by
a batch-normalization layer. This is caused by collapse in
the intermediate layers, that are driven to producing con-
stant outputs–either by the kernel weights going to 0, or bi-
ases to large negative values that saturate the ReLUs—and
once this happens, the gradients to the encoder vanish and
training is unable to move away from this solution.
To address this, we include normalization at the output of
every layer in the encoder network to make the activations
have zero mean and unit variance. Specifically, we add a
normalization layer after every convolution and completely
remove all learnable biases (ensuring that half of all Re-
LUs are activated). However, we find using standard batch-
normalization, which normalizes activations both across the
batch and all spatial locations, to be insufficient. This is
because even with such normalization, the encoder has the
ability to produce a constant output—which has different
values at different spatial locations to satisfy the variance
constraint, but has the same value for a given location for
all inputs. (Although the encoder is convolutional, it is able
to achieve this by detecting padded values at the border).
Thus, even when using standard batch-normalization af-
ter every layer and removing all learnable biases, encoder
training remains unstable and often collapses to the trivial
solution. Therefore, we use a “per-location” normalization
layer that separately normalizes the activation at each spa-
tial location, with statistics of each location computed by
averaging over a batch (this is equivalent to treating the out-
put of convolutional layers as a single large vector). This
layer thus forces the encoder to produce different outputs
for different images, and we use this per-location normal-
ization at all layers, including the output. As our experi-
ments show, this strategy reliably prevents collapse to the
trivial solution, and leads to stable training in every experi-
ment across a wide range of tasks and settings.
4. Experimental Results
4.1. Preliminaries
Tasks and Dataset. We evaluate our framework on its abil-
ity to inhibit identification of specific scene categories on
images from the Places-365 dataset [28]. Identification is
framed as binary classification: whether an image belongs
to a specific category or not. We train different encoders to
inhibit detection of a specific category. We then fix each en-
coder, and evaluate privacy as the ability to train a classifier
for that category, and utility as the ability to train classifiers
for other categories. For each identification task, we train
and evaluate classifiers on a balanced dataset where half
the images belong to that category—therefore, the “prior”
for each task is chance. These sets are constructed from
two groups of ten categories each, from Places-3651. The
1Group 1: arch, army base, airport terminal, airfield, alley, arena
hockey, amusement park, apartment bldg., aquarium, arena rodeo. Group
2: amphitheater, auto showroom, airplane cabin, arch. excavation, art stu-
dio, artists loft, assembly line, athletic field, atrium, auto factory.
negative examples for each identification task are uniformly
sampled from the other nine categories in the same group.
We construct non-overlapping training, validation, and test-
ing sets from the official Places-365 training set.
Inputs to our encoder are RGB images of a fixed size
224 × 224. These were constructed from the Places-365
images—with random scaling and crops for data augmen-
tation during training, and a fixed scale and center-crop for
evaluation. The encoder produces 28×28 three-channel im-
ages as output, and these are provided as input to the clas-
sification networks. The architectures of both the encoder
and classification networks (we used the same architecture
for all tasks) are shown in Fig. 2.
Training Details. We train various encoders to inhibit dif-
ferent identification tasks as described in Sec. 3, some with
generic variance constraints and others with the objective of
promoting specific desirable tasks as in (4)(with α = 2−4).
We use the Adam optimizer [16], and due to our dependence
on per-location normalization, train with a large batch size
of 128 images. We begin by training the classifier for 5k
iterations as “warm up” against a randomly initialized en-
coder, and then proceed with alternating updates to the en-
coder and classifiers. The learning rate for the classifier is
kept fixed at 10−4. For the encoder, we begin with a rate
of 10−4, but then drop it by (0.1)1/4 every 200k iterations.
Empirically, dropping the learning rate has a significant ef-
fect on subsequent classification performance after the en-
coder is fixed, since the encoder now trains to inhibit a clas-
sifier that is able to adapt at increasingly faster relative rates.
We train the encoders for a total of 860k iterations.
Verification Protocol. After training, we fix the encoders
and measure success at achieving privacy based on limiting
the ability of a classifier to learn to solve the negative task,
and utility based on solving non-private tasks. To evaluate
this, we train classifiers from scratch, for each task and each
encoder, using encoded images for training. We train all
classifiers also using Adam, with the initial learning rate set
to 10−5 (we empirically found higher values to be unstable)
in all cases except for those trained on the original images—
where we were able to use a higher initial learning rate of
10−4. We keep training all classifiers at this learning rate till
the validation accuracy saturates, and follow this one learn-
ing rate drop by a factor of 0.1 and continue training till the
accuracy saturates again. Note that for private tasks against
encoders learned using the proposed framework, this often
requires training classifiers for orders of magnitude more
iterations than on original images.
4.2. Comparison to Traditional Optimization
Effect of Label Flip-based Updates. We first illustrate the
importance of computing gradient updates for the encoder
Task -Army Base -Airport T.
(+Airport T.) (+Army Base)
WITHIN ADVERSARIAL OPTIMIZATION: VAL SET
Standard GAN 51.1% 50.1%
Label Flip 52.1% 53.6%
VERIFICATION W/ FIXED ENCODER: VAL SET
Standard GAN 83.9% 84.4%
Label Flip 64.2% 73.9%
VERIFICATION W/ FIXED ENCODER: TEST SET
Standard GAN 84.3% 84.5%
Label Flip 65.3% 73.5%
Table 1. Private Attribute Classifier performance on encoders
trained with flipped-label vs standard GAN updates: (a) within ad-
versarial optimization; and (b) on verification with fixed encoders.
with respect to flipped labels as described in Sec. 3.2, in-
stead of standard updates—used in GAN training, domain
adaptation, etc.—that minimize loss with respect to the in-
correct label, to inhibit the private attribute classifier. In
Table 1, we report results for two cases of training encoders
with respect to the objective in (4) to inhibit detection of
one scene category while promoting detection of another—
alternating between “Army Base” and “Airport Terminal”
as the private and useful tasks. We report accuracy of clas-
sifiers for the private attributes at the end of adversarial en-
coder training. Then, we measure the accuracy of classi-
fiers trained exhaustively under our verification protocol af-
ter fixing the encoders, and report these on encoders trained
both with standard GAN updates and our flipped label loss.
We see that within adversarial training, the private classi-
fiers are nearly perfectly inhibited and have accuracy close
to chance—indeed, the standard GAN updates even lead to
slightly better inhibition. But crucially, once the classifiers
are allowed to train while the encoder remains fixed, they
recover to a significantly greater degree against encoders
trained with the GAN updates (this is also visualized in
Fig. 1) than against those trained using our approach. This
highlights the importance of the flipped label loss in learn-
ing a resilient encoder that has a permanently inhibiting ef-
fect on private classifier performance.
Stability with Per-location Normalization. Next, we dis-
cuss the need to stabilize training by using per-location nor-
malization without biases after every intermediate layer in
the encoder—note that all encoders in Table. 1 were trained
with this normalization. As described in Sec. 3, the encoder
in our setting has access to all inputs to the classifier, and
thus collapse to a degenerate solution with constant outputs
BINARY SCENE CLASSIFICATION PERFORMANCE (CHANCE = 0.5)
Encoder Army Airport Airfield Arch Alley Hockey †Amphi- †AutoBase Terminal Arena theater Showroom
Identity .983 .967 .982 .942 .969 .995 .951 .958
Naive Blur .914 .869 .951 .782 .881 .966 .843 .898
-Army Base .754 .761 .896 .678 .781 .919 .803 .827
-Airport T. .796 .750 .891 .694 .832 .915 .815 .851
-Airfield .639 .667 .811 .613 .712 .824 .701 .565
-Arch .796 .806 .905 .701 .848 .922 .826 .868
+Army Base
-Airport T. .956 .736 .873 .621 .774 .877 .789 .620
-Army Base
+Airport T. .653 .916 .836 .612 .751 .821 .785 .721
-Army Base
+Airport T.,
Alley
.717 .930 .897 .723 .912 .921 .813 .826
-Army Base
+Airport T.,
Airfield, Alley
.807 .939 .967 .741 .890 .918 .862 .890
-Army Base
+Arch
.801 .802 .932 .867 .840 .938 .870 .855
† Categories from Group 2.
Table 2. Scene Category Detection Performance with Different Encoders. We consider a variety of encoders (one per row) using our
approach to inhibit different tasks, with both generic output variance constraints (rows 3 to 6), as well as to promote specific desirable
tasks (rows 7 to 12). For comparison, we also consider the original images themselves (row 1), as well as images degraded by blur as
a simple baseline (row 2). For each encoder, we train classifiers on encoded images to solve different scene detection tasks—including
private tasks that the encoders were trained to inhibit (red), desirable tasks they were trained to promote (green), and tasks that the encoder
was trained neither to inhibit nor promote (rest)—and report test set classification accuracy. Note that every classifier (one for each cell in
the table) is trained exhaustively till saturation against a fixed encoder. For private task classifiers training on encodings produced by our
learned encoders, this takes between 1-4.5M iterations, while classifiers training on the original images train much faster (all crossing 90%
validation accuracy within 20k iterations.).
is a concern. To demonstrate the importance of normal-
ization, we train encoders for inhibiting “Army Base” (this
time with a generic variance constraint) with the following
modified settings: no batch normalization in intermediate
layers, regular batch-normalization (with spatial and batch
averaging) without biases, per-location normalization but
with biases, and per-location normalization without biases
(the proposed setting). In the first case, the encoder col-
lapses to a state where the output variance constraint is vio-
lated for all outputs. In the next two cases, we see a partial
collapse in the solution. With regular batch normalization
without biases, 75% of the final outputs have zero variance.
And while per-location batch normalization with biases is
able to prevent any of the output variances from going to
zero, 90% of them have variance less than 0.5. In contrast,
our approach of per-location normalization without biases
yields a solution that satisfies the variance constraint—and
we find that it consistently leads to stable training in all our
experiments (discussed next). This highlights the impor-
tance of including our normalization strategy in the encoder
network.
4.3. Evaluation of Privacy and Utility
Finally, we conduct a broad evaluation of our method’s
ability to inhibit private tasks while maintaining utility. We
train encoders for different combinations of private tasks
with both generic and task-specific utility constraints. For
each encoder, we train classifiers using our verification pro-
tocol for a number of scene-detection tasks—tasks that the
encoder was trained to (a) inhibit, (b) promote, or (c) nei-
ther to inhibit nor promote. We report the test set perfor-
mance of these classifiers in Table 2, and for context, also
report classifier performance on the original images them-
selves (reported as the “Identity” encoding), as well a sim-
ple blur baseline. The blur baseline is not task specific,
and simply produces 28 × 28 image outputs by applying
an 120× 120 averaging filter (our encoder’s receptive field
is 112 × 112) and downsampling by a factor of 8. While
Table 2 shows the final accuracy achieved by the classifiers,
our encoders also slow down their training—Fig. 1 illus-
Figure 3. Visualization of Encoder Outputs. We visualize outputs for various images from our learned encoders, with the far-right
column indicating test accuracy for classifiers trained on encoded outputs. The first two rows show the original images, and blurred images
we consider as a baseline. The remaining rows visualize encoders trained with our approach, to inhibiting (- sign in left column) and
promote (+ sign in left column) specific scene detection tasks.
trates this by showing the evolution of validation loss dur-
ing classifier training. We also visualize some of the learned
encoding functions in Fig. 3, where we show examples of
typically encoded images for each encoder. To better show
the variability between images, we map the encoder output
to an RGB image by mapping the value at each location and
channel to a histogram equalized value.
We begin by discussing the performance of encoders
trained against four group 1 tasks with only the generic vari-
ance constraint, and see that in every case, these cause con-
siderable degradation in their corresponding private task ac-
curacy over classification of original images, much more so
than the blur baseline. Looking at the performance across
tasks, it is apparent that some tasks are easier to solve and
therefore harder to inhibit (e.g., see “airfield”). This is
likely because some categories have a larger number of re-
dundant cues that are harder to effectively censor. This is
why the learned encoders have different degrees of success
in censoring different tasks. Interestingly, censoring such
easily solved tasks leads to overall poorer performance for
other tasks as well likely due to the encoder being forced
to remove a lot of information that may also be useful for
other tasks. Conversely, some tasks are hard to solve (like
“arch”), and these are easily inhibited even when they are
not targeted by the encoder. But an encoder trained to in-
hibit these tasks is found to preserve classification accuracy
for remaining tasks to a greater degree.
We next consider encoders that are trained using (4) to
promote certain desirable tasks, while inhibiting the private
task. This allows the encoder to retain specifically useful
image cues, as opposed to simply preserving output vari-
ance. In Table 2, we find that this approach almost always
yields high accuracy for the targeted desirable tasks, with
little to no difference in the encoder’s ability to inhibit the
private task. Indeed, using this approach we are able to
enable high accuracy for “arch” task (which suffered poor
accuracy in all the generic variance encoders) while inhibit-
ing “army base”. Interestingly, preserving specific desirable
tasks also has a generalization effect, with improved accu-
racy on tasks other than the desirable (and private) tasks.
To this end, we train encoders with multiple desirable tasks
(with Iv formulated as anN+1-way classification forN de-
sirable tasks), and find that as we increase the set of positive
tasks, the encoder generalizes to providing more and more
general utility (albeit, with some degradation in privacy).
This implies that by choosing a diverse set of positive tasks
during training, an encoder can learn to retain information
for a broad class of applications.
5. Conclusion
We presented an effective and practical method for learn-
ing image encoding functions that remove information re-
lated to sensitive private tasks. We considered a formula-
tion based on adversarial optimization between the encod-
ing function and estimators for the private tasks, modeling
both as deep neural networks. We described a stable and
convergent strategy for optimization, which yielded encod-
ings that permanently inhibit recovery of private attributes
while maintaining utility as shown experimentally with an
exhaustive verification protocol.
Note that we did not constrain our encoded outputs to
appear natural, or resemble the original data. Consequently,
our framework requires classifiers for the desirable tasks to
also be retrained. Others (e.g., [17, 3, 5]) have successfully
incorporated such requirements in different approaches to
privacy and censorship, and one of our goals in future work
is to extend our framework in a similar manner.
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